Sustained forests; sustained profits
Sustained forests; sustained profits
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The author, Robert H. Giles, Jr., argues that an objective of a new group of people taking a systems approach to large wild animal problems should be to manage damage within a total, profitable, long-term system, not necessarily control the "pest." The needs are for well-grounded financial analyses both for customers, the public, the resource and the well-being of the profession, effective practice, feedback, and a stable profit base. A point of view is advanced of the need for evolution of present pest-related operations into a new, unique profession, involved in a profound way as an element of a cost-effective total land production system.
Introduction
Over my career I have backed into things. Not in my car, but in the woods! I backed into maple thickets in Oregon, blackberry bushes in the Virginia Piedmont, "laurel" (rhododendron) in North Carolina, and who knows what collection of awful things in Florida. I expect you understand very well "backing in." I want to back into this paper. Over the years I have advocated to my classes in systems ecology that they back into their analyses. I also say "start at the end." By this I mean think about the desired end conditions, the history you wish you could read, or what you expect in some final evaluation report, and then work backwards, up the flow chart, to be sure that the desired final condition happens. We need now to look into an analysis of vertebrate damage management for the future.
Practical Memory
Ray Hilborn (1992), a fisheries scientist, complained that fisheries, as a field of work, has no institutional memory. As we think about the vertebrate damage management system for the future we need to be sure we have a memory that prevents us from making the same mistakes. We cannot avoid making mistakes (for reasons too many to discuss here). We can usually avoid making the same mistake. Hilborn (1992) observed that there are few places where the need for institutional learning has occurred (March 1988) but there is evidence that it can occur and it is intuitive that it is needed.
There have been amazing changes in technology and in society, and some people will argue that history has little meaning today. I only argue that many good ideas have failed because of a poor presentation or because they were presented at the wrong time or place, or to the wrong person. The past system context for an idea was wrong; failure was not due to the quality of the idea. To document the reason for the failure may allow the efficiencies of the idea to be gained later. History does cost, but so does any mistake or past inefficiency. We need a cost-effective memory, one that is brief, practical, oriented to a high probability of retrieval. We need one with a mechanism for being moved into current decision making.
In order to develop a practical memory, I suggest:
I assume that techniques will be improved and thus embodied within each of them is a form of institutional learning. I am more concerned about remembering what did not work and why it was changed. I am even more concerned that the reason why the technique was first used may have changed. This is called "displacement of the objective" and it brings me to my next topic.
Objectives
We need to start at the end of things. By "starting at the end " I mean that we need a clear statement of a destination. That is the only way we can tell when we have arrived. (The clarity of the logic exceeds the clarity of the map to the destination.) What will be the "good " in this history that we create for ourselves? We have to be sure that our work on improved traps, trapping, and repellents does not displace the objective. Why were we doing this work in the first place? Perhaps the objective was improved profit. If so, the evaluation of our work in the net income column should not be displaced by trap effectiveness, number of traps, area covered, or animals taken. There can be big differences between the two.
I have studied objectives and objective setting for years (Giles 1981, Lee 1972) and with students (Buffington-Lobdell-Waldron-Cowles and Giles 1982 Ritter-Hamed). It is a topic as discussible as UFOs and, based on the evidence that I now have, just about as meaningful. Over many years I have argued for stating a large set of objectives (because we have many), estimating the amounts of each product or service that we need, assigning relative importance to each (because I know they are not of equal importance), assigning a probability of success or failure (because nature or weather, etc., will have its way no matter what our objectives may be), and then stating what we will substitute for some of those things we "demand." This all gets very complicated as in the following equation, but it is readily handled by computer. At least the equation and the relations described in it can help people understand and explain why some people are so sympathetic and other people have such disagreements. The chance of two people having equal objectives is almost zero.
The equations expressing the above for the people of a region are:
R* = R/C
R = ((B - B*)/B*) x 100
B = 
p=1 to P t=1 to T i=1 to I DVES [K]
The definitions are:
B = perceived benefits at a time for analyzing system performance
P = the total number of publics or groups of people with significantly different concepts of minimally acceptable benefits
p = the individual public or group to be satisfied by the system manager(s)
T = the planning period limit or horizon, typically 50 years
t = the year (but shorter periods like seasons or months may be used)
I = the total list of objectives (usually more than 30)
i = the numbered objective
D = the units of demand for products, services or other benefits
V = the estimated relative importance or value of each unit of demand for each public in each year. This demand may increase or decline. The selected unit of greatest importance is assigned a value of 100 and all other values are compared to it. Units may have equal value. Units may have zero value but if so, by definition, there is no "objective", and it is excluded from computations.
E = the expected value, the probability of achieving 1 unit of demand or 1 minus the probability of failure or non-achievement.
S = the substitutability of a unit of demand or 1 minus the probability of a substitute. (It is not as important to work to achieve units of demand for which substitutes are readily apparent. Later matrix formulations are explicit for what units can substitute for others.)
[K] = a set of constraints in the law, policy, agency or business regulation one that includes factors such as limits on resources, carrying capacity, and opposition to exotic species.
B* = a desired condition in which minimum stated benefits are achieved.
C = present-discounted costs of the entire operation seeking to produce the benefits. This unit is also subject to constraints such as maximum budgets and practices for which money may not be spent.
R = is a scoring manipulation allowing observed or actual benefits relative to desired benefits to be expressed as a "score" of from 0 to 100.
R* = a modified benefit to cost ratio, the intent of systems work being to maximize the score for the minimum costs.
Vertebrate damage management specialists (managers) are perceived (at least by me) as working at all parts of the system to maximize R* (which as stated in the above equation) is to reduce losses, achieve demand, modify values, make expectations realistic, encourage substitutions, and reduce costs and losses.
Now, however, I give up! I've fought the good fight and failed. I give up on trying to get people to work with such objectives. I suggest that the objective for our field be to assist (public and private) land and property owners to maximize profits by minimizing system costs (and equivalent actual or perceived losses) to vertebrate wild and semi-domestic animals, all subject to legal, ecological, economic, esthetic, and energetic constraints; all within a 10% zone of performance; and all counted over a dynamic 100-year planning period.
That is it. That is all. Just do it; any way possible. The scientists can work on the basic processes; the economists can work on the algorithms; the foresters and agronomists can worry about whether "yield" means wood, tomatoes, or profit; the nay-sayers can debate profit-motives, the free-market, and entrepreneurial systems. The ecologists can struggle with what "relations" really mean and search for true "interactions", and the vertebrate damage managers can work with them all.
V D M
I do not approve of the word "integrated" in IPM (integrated pest management) (cf Giles 1980). If I am managing, I am integrating. The modern person working in our field is working with a whole complex system. They are attempting to manage (or assist in managing) a whole system. Not to integrate things as a manager is silly, without meaning. I am opposed to the idea of managing pests. I want to manage their effect or perceived effect (e.g., a bat flying through bakery). I may have to kill or move an animal or increase its predators, but I can use barriers. I can use metal containers. When I exclude mice from grain, am I managing pests? Poisoning them, yes; excluding them, I think not. Of course I am managing their effects. When I prevent damage, I rarely do anything to the animals themselves. When I change knowledge of a cute animal into a disease vector, have and I managed the pest? I think not; only the perception of the animal problem. I think we should manage perceived damage and reduce it at reasonable costs, not just manage pests.
I have no option but to hold on to the word vertebrate. As a person advocating a total system view, I see no way to separate high quality work on reducing costs and losses from wild animals -- whether they are vertebrates or invertebrates is a matter of their bones, not my practice. When I think of mosquitoes I am thinking of tree holes and birds and flying squirrels. When I think of mice I think of fleas and plague. When I recommend "sanitation" I am as involved in reducing invertebrates as vertebrates. When I work with moles I am actively involved (or believe I should be) with invertebrates, the beetles in the soil. I give up! Use "vertebrate"; draw another line, restrict our work and thoughts; but let us realize what we have done. Let us see these divisions we have made as a regional line created for efficiency, employment, and for teaching and not as ground to be fought over as if by territorial squawking birds.
We are not wildlife managers because they cannot decide who they are. They cannot decide and neither can we. They call themselves "biologists" but will rarely talk about botany, require little botany in their education, spend 80% of their professional time working with plants (which they call "habitat") and cannot recognize a professional society take-over by an emerging bunch with the non-name of "conservation biology." "Teaming with Wildlife" a national tax proposal, if successful, will unleash massive new pest problems. Agencies have struggled with names and proper "homes" for vertebrate damage management work for years. The Fish and Wildlife Service with its own identity crises over many years (in the very name itself) allowed most damage work to move to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Amazed observers note that moves within Departments are common; between Departments, rare.
We are regulators; we are "Extension"; we are emergency services; we are public health workers; members of the agroforestry and agro-silvo-pastoral efforts. We are very diverse and scattered throughout health fields, agriculture, military, product suppliers, inventors, and livestock people. As customs workers we stand guard to prevent invasions; as students we follow those creatures already having invaded.
My view is that the demands for effective vertebrate damage management are profound. They encompass all of the concepts, techniques, and work of the field once called game management, now called imprecisely and inaccurately wildlife management, they demand more breadth of knowledge of ecology, more than classical wildlife management, and simultaneously require integration of the knowledge domains of economics, esthetics, and energetics ... all within the envelope of enforcement systems.
We need total systems people. What person recommends population controls to a person going into bankruptcy? What person accepts costs of operations far greater than the benefits likely to be received? What more that the most simple economics requires that we discount treatment costs over the life of a program if we are going to do reasonable financial analyses. More that "biologists" are needed!
I am now convinced that more good for humanity can be done over the next 20 years for the expanding world of 5.7 billion people by people in the vertebrate damage management area than by all advances in agricultural research (Huffaker et al. 1976). We can reduce losses of the total production by 10% or more; agriculturists are unlikely to increase net production by that much.
Vertebrate damage management is an essential in modern society. It is an essential for survival. The population is expanding. We shall not bring it under control. It will double in 50 years at our present rate. It has already doubled since I've been on Earth. I feel crowded, stressed; things are half-as sweet, we are more than twice as "bad off."
We have to see ourselves, clearly, to be very, very important for ourselves, our natural resources, and for our children. Who are we for the future? Vertebrate damage managers? I once defined wildlife management using the phrase "the science and art" (Giles 1971). I now reject that. Wildlife management just means deciding and manipulating populations, habitats, and people. There is science and some art, but much more. It is just doing it. "Science" crept into my thought and that of U.S. society with Sputnik. If anything was scientific it was good. That secretly slipped into "it is only good if it is scientific." Now we can step back and realize that there are many ways to know things. Science (typically induction/deduction) is only one. We need a new way to proceed. Science can help, but it is only one of many ways to know-- to know how to manage vertebrate damage.
The Knowledge Base
We have to use the power of the geographic information system (Jones 1976, deSteiger and Giles 1981, Giles and Nielsen 1991) to understand what animals are involved where; what people are involved; what the estimated real losses are and how those will match with the estimated costs of control, enforcement, applications, and inspections. We now have wildlife information systems in more than 20 states; we have demonstrated we can "do ecology" at the level of areas about one-third the size of a football field. We've moved past speculation and dreams of Giles (1973) and into the world of monthly advances in relevant applications heralded in trade magazines (e.g., GIS World).
I have spent 30 years modeling natural resource systems and advocating use of systems analyses and computer decision aids (Giles 1979). I now finally realize that every model I attempted to create requires more data, more inputs, then I could ever get (eg. Wajda 1993; Gruen 1993). I attributed my lack of success to someone else's failure to get and hold data for me. A simple vertebrate population model with any practical meaning requires a minimum of 34 pieces of information. These data are rarely available for any population, even those most intensively studied! It is interesting to think about them, program them, simulate what would happen if certain numbers existed, but we now know that the numbers do not exist and the funds for getting them do not exist, and the time required to get and process them is too great for them to be of timely use. I once thought funny the statement "We can use a computer to predict exactly the next-day's weather--- but it takes a week to run it!" Just last year a forest model was reported to take on today's fast PCs, 3 weeks to run! The situation is no longer funny. Timely approximations from feasible-to-run programs remain needed. We need powerful alternatives, one of which is a growing knowledge base with emphasis on ranges and medians, not means and deviation. We need all of the aspects of the rationally robust paradigm (Giles 1979, Giles et al. 1993).
The Rationally Robust Paradigm
There are 11 components of the paradigm which I propose (Giles et al. 1993) as a replacement paradigm for the pseudo-scientific, crisis-response, agency-bound, predominantly socialistic policies under which much vertebrate damage management work is now done. All of these, I assert, are to concentrate on profit (within constraints) as defined above. They are:
1.Use site-specific knowledge, typically in a GIS, acknowledging that every site is unique.
2.Acknowledge the limits and consistency of financial support, minimizing costs and accepting the unlikelihood of long-term studies.
3.De-emphasize induction and deduction as bases of knowledge, replacing them with other bases.
4.Accept lower confidence levels for (statistical) sampling and reaching conclusions.
5.Use estimates of median values.
6.Use knowledge of statistical range limits of ecological factors.
7.Study the system's phenomenon of equifinality and its consequences.
8.De-emphasize time in system analyses, replacing it with other phenomena such as cumulative energy received.
9.Use regression techniques, simultaneously using factors that operate in many models(e.g.,precipitation.)
10.Use regression and modeling techniques to accommodate the non-linear nature of most economic, aesthetic, and ecological systems.
11.Operate as if in a clinical milieu, with conservative changes made rapidly with feedback.
Constrained Profit
Years ago state soil-testing labs were privatized. Free (tax-paid) soil tests were inappropriate in an entrepreneurial system. Only when an open market existed did private soil labs become possible. By analogy, and for other more compelling reasons, I hold that vertebrate damage management can and should exist in an open market environment. The public is inadequately served by the budget-strapped, inefficient agency. Needs are increasing, the tax base is not increasing, the customer is changing rapidly to the urbanite or to the agrobusiness person. The power of the current knowledge of the field is not being used and developments for the future remain in the hands of a tax-limited few in public agencies seeking to placate strongly-different, politically-weighted demands.
In the applied field, I believe studies should be done by companies to achieve a competitive edge. Superior students that will work will be recruited by well-paying companies. Effective practices will be used to achieve highest success for lowest cost as in any open-market system. Prevention contracts will be seen to be as valuable as fire insurance. Rapid-response units will form as collectives from within often-competing companies. Of course, there will remain regulation, the enforcement of which is the rightful role of agencies, but beyond this, there is the need for vital companies working to help land owners make profit, reducing inappropriate regulation and control costs, and either adding gains or reducing losses from vertebrates. A deer (for example) in a regulated environment is at once an urban pet, a crop destroyer, an aesthetic entity, and a potential trophy game animal. It destroys endangered plants, changes forest structure, contributes to improving forest site index, is a highway hazard, and is a vector of ticks transmitting Lyme disease.
There is no "solution" for the deer problem. It is called by one analyst a "wicked problem" for which there is no solution, only the needs for management to blunt the extreme conditions for separate groups. The professional vertebrate damage manager is needed. Such people can deal with such large, complex, multi-faceted problems. How will they (or society or customers) know when they succeed when there is not a solution? By the measure of constrained profit. The constraints are ecological (do not extirpate; do not diminish an endangered species; work for ecosystem health (yet undefined). They are also economic or monetary (limited staff, equipment, budgets, cash flow, time, required profit, and discount rate). The constraints are also energetic (energy conservation and preparedness for looming fossil-energy shortages). They are aesthetic (subject to group and individual sensibilities relature to humane tactics, animal care, and animal removals). Except for major public constraints (laws, regulations, and policies), moving professional work to the private sector allows an objective to be decided and progress to be made. Without such clarification, damage/or pest-related agencies are a drift. Their performance is recited in calls made, animals moved and other numbers unrelated to their real objective -- presumably the health, safety, welfare, economic well-being, and quality of life of citizens (Giles 1982). No one yet has a measure for the collective "social good" (except R* described above) and I do not recommend waiting for one to be developed or used. In our modern society, I recommend working toward constrained profit in a free enterprise system.
Profit vs Yield
In modeling tomato disease, I discovered that the effect of disease on profit was not known. Must 100% crop loss always be assumed? Perhaps birds cause loss of grade in a fruit... but what is the total loss in profit for the year, given the current complex of supports, tariffs, and transportation cost? What was the tolerable loss for a landowner before the minimum profit threshold was passed?
One observer (Dyer 1997) recently observed that there were few studies, few data sets, that would allow anyone to conclude the real effects (increased profits) from using repellents. In a paper in Holmes and Clement (1996) on fish-eating birds there was the observation that "as yet, no study in Britain or Ireland has demonstrated, without doubt, serious losses to fisheries attributable solely to bird depredation." We have to collect information and assemble our information and draw careful conclusions. I tend to doubt whether this must be called "science", but I know it must be done vigorously and carefully. If not, we remain caught in "conflict space" with no exits - for backing out or proceeding head-held-high.
I once suggested to an agency that my models of a boll weevil control program could suggest very effective control that would increase cotton supplies and cause the price of cotton to drop, perhaps below a profit margin. I was encouraged not to pursue that line of analysis.
Sustained yield is required of the U.S. Forest Service. Oft debated, it is very important that yield be interpreted as profit, not cubic yards of wood. Neither in forestry nor elsewhere is biological yield the end result needed. Sustained productivity of products in a deflated economy can lead to bankruptcy.
The point of these examples is that there is a need, a glowing opportunity for a modern profession of vertebrate damage management to step into the forestry-agricultural and the expanded residential-urban realm to help customers see clearly their monetary or financial situation and to engage in cost-effective analyses of their enterprise and the role that rational vertebrate damage management can play.
Critics have for years claimed that no one can quantify the worth of a duck or the beauty of a sunset. I advocate not trying, agreeing. My hypothesis is that "money talks"; that when financial concerns are clearly incorporated into a 100-year profit-making enterprise with all the needed societal constraints, then all of those extra, said-to-be non-quantifiable needs will be amply accommodated - ducks and sunsets.
As an example of the argument for a view, (e.g., a sunset from picture window), the cost of retaining that view can be computed if an optimum solution requires it be impaired. How sub-optimal will be the solution it the scene is retained? The difference for the decision maker is the amount of money foregone - all discounted over a long time. Loss of trees, loss of animals, and threats of danger (e.g., from poisonous snakes) can be similarly made explicit and moved to the table for decision. Now they do not exist so they have no "place."
The VDM System
The professional manager is not yet being produced in the University. It is unlikely this will occur soon for reasons I am embarrassed to discuss so I recommend and believe a high-intensity educational program can emerge. Created by one company or a collective, education for profit can emerge. Research needs to be company specific, but it too may find that a research and development group serving in and affiliated with a University may be useful (for many reasons, mostly related to cost effectiveness and existing subsidies). "Basic research" will rarely be tolerated; use of existing knowledge, synthesis, and modeling to help find the sensitive areas that can be manipulated will be the task of this group, which itself, can be financially self-sufficient.
The "pest control operator" has already had many tools removed from the arsenal of managerial tactics. The new profession needs to regain these, overcome the reasons for past removals, and to exercise skillful, site-specific, timely, cost-effective field work after the computer-aided analysis has been made of expected financial returns in the context of the customer's needs (and society's constraints). [I find this free-market concept analogous to the freedom to go anywhere in the U.S., as long as your follow the rules of the road.]
We in vertebrate damage management have to achieve at least in some place a level of expertise, competence, and image that will allow us to do the work needed. I have in mind an image of a Mayo Clinic, a Rand Corporation. I have in mind military special forces - Rangers or Seals. There are pieces of an image, one or more centers of exceptional capability in analyzing, designing, and implementing a vertebrate damage management system. I am convinced that with increasing college costs, shrinking hours, grade inflation, professors without experience, a persuasive reductionalist research paradigm (which will change no time soon), and narrow departmentlism, there will be no graduates to hire for these imagined centers of excellence. Therefore I see the need to privatize an educational center for the vertebral damage management system. We cannot count on the University. Once or two modified curricula locked within the present-day University cannot handle the task or overcome the contextual inertia for the tasks ahead. Ventebrate damage managers need their own "special force" educational center, one that recruits special people, educates them (and continues to do so) to deal with the total production system for society, and then does it.
Along with the people of such a center there will be needed complex staff work to implement the selective, unique tasks usually needed. Usually average solutions are suboptimal. Suboptimum is the enemy. There is need for the injunction, the subvention, the emergency procedure - in carefully analyzed situations. The law is right for the average, everyday case; as a message of policy and limits. The growing daily needs however, are for laser surgery, pinpoint accuracy, and the unique strike. We have a long way to go and we'll not do it in 50 state offices, several national offices, or several agency offices. We'll not do it defining ourselves as PCO's or as wildlifer's with an emphasis, or as entomologists that apply their knowledge to large animals, or as health officer more interested in the virus than the vectors "but what can you do?"
Let me assure you that I am very serious. Do not dismiss the message today as that of an after-thought presented a small regional conference to avoid "perishing without publishing." We have within our grasp a profound need - safety, health, food, forests, rangeland, and quality urban spaces. We can have that only when a vital system of vertebrate damage management is operated. It is too large and complex to be designed and managed by the average "grade C" University graduate of a non-descriptor, small curriculum full of electives. It will not be handled well by a biologist never having a course in economics. The molecular biologist will not master "all ecology" in one watered-down, over-extended, and case-history-infused course on that topic. With only 3 percent of the U.S. population now living on farms, the vocabulary of the field is no longer known by person on the street. Without the words there can be no understanding!
I do not like very much where my thoughts have taken me. Perhaps I should back track. Maybe "backing in" has been very bad. "Backing in" can be dangerous if you don't know where you are going. I know where vertebrate damage management must end up - a vital field of work serving all society, working to achieve the most profound of social, ecological, and esthetic objectives - working as purposefully achieving partnerships in human health, safety, foods, welfare, recreation, and defense.
We are too important; we know too much; people suffer too much damage. We must develop a bold new strategy and then take action to create the vertebrate damage management so badly needed for the future.
Literature Cited
Buffington, C. D. 1972. An analysis of the decision-making systems within the National Wildlife Refuge System. Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Va. x + 167 pp.
Cowles, C. J. and R. H. Giles, Jr. 1982. A linear programming simulator for optimizing spatial distribution and movements of environmental protection personnel. J. Environ. Manage. 15:311-322.
DeSteiguer, J. E. and R. H. Giles, Jr. 1981. Introduction to computerized land-information systems. J. Forestry 79(11):734-737.
Dyer
Giles, R. H., R. G. Oderwald, and A. U. Ezealor. 1993. Toward a rationally robust paradigm for agroforestry systems. Agroforestry systems 24:24-37.
Giles, R. H., Jr. and L. A. Nielsen. 1991. The uses of geographic information systems in fisheries management: dealing with development in the watershed. Symposium Proceedings, AFS, Newport, R.I.
Giles, R. H., Jr. 1987. Systems ecology, marketing, and quality of life, p. 112-128 in A. C. Samli (ed). Marketing and quality of life interface. Quarum Books, New York, NY, 348pp.
Giles, R. H., Jr. 1982. Management knowledge through wildlife research: a perspective. Env. Manage. 6 (3): 185-191.
Giles, R. H., Jr. 1981. Assessing landowner objectives for wildlife, p. 112-129, in R. T. Dumke, G. V. Burger, and J. R. March (Eds.) Wildlife management on private lands, Proc. of a Symposium, Milwaukee, WI, LaCrosse Printing Co., LaCrosse, WI 54601. 576 pp.
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Giles, R. H., Jr. 1979. Modeling decisions or ecological systems? p. 147-159 in J. cairns, Jr., G. P. Patil, and W. E. Waters (Eds.) Environmental biomonitoring, assessment, prediction, and management-certain case studies and related quantitative issues, international Cooperative Pub. House, Fairland, Md., 438 p.
Giles, R. H., Jr. 1979. Using computers in evaluating vertebrate pest control procedures, p. 304-312 in J. R. Beck (ed.) Vertebrate pest control and management materials, ASTM Tech. Pub 680, Amer. Soc. for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, Pa. 323pp.
Giles, R. H., Jr. 1973. Night flight across a blue sky: prognostics. Proc. Bird Control Seminar, Bowling Green State University, Bowlng Green, Ohio 6:223-228.
Giles, R. H., Jr. 1964. The ecology of a small forested watershed treated with the insecticide malathion S35. Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus. 418 pp. Multilithed (Univ. Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan) order no. 64-9563.
Gruen, K. A. 1993. Mesoscale temperature estimates for Western Virginia, M.S. Thesis, Va. Poly. Inst. and State Univ., Blacksburg, Va. 164 pp.
Hamed,Safei. 1993. Lancscape ecology within arid countries. PhD Dissertation, Va Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia
Hilborn, R. 1992. Can fisheries agencies learn from experience. Fisheries 17(4):6-14.
Hoar, A. R. 1980. An airport environmental information system for Virginia. Unpub. M.S. Thesis, Va. Poly. Inst. and State Univ., Blacksburg, Va., viii + 307 p.
Holmes, J. S. and P. Clement (eds) 1996. Fish-eating birds: proceedings of a seminar to review status, interactions with fisheries and licensing issues, Joint Nature Conservation Comm. UK Nature Cons. No. 15, Peterborough, England 17pp.
Huffker, C. B., R. F. Smith, and A. P. Gutierrez. 1976. The need for systems analysis and its use in the US/IBP integrated pest management project, p. 209-215 in R. L. Tummalla, D. L. Haynes, and B.A. Croft (eds.) Modeling for pest management: concepts, techniques, and applications, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich 247 pp.
Jones, A. B. III. 1976. Power: a computer information system for land use decisions. Unpup. M. S. Thesis, Va. Poly. Inst. and State Univ., Blacksburg, Va., ix 194p.
Lee, J. M., Jr. 1972. Citizen participation in wildlife management decision making: the squirrel hunting season as an example. M.S. Thesis, V.P.I. and S.U., Blacksburg, VA xi + 164pp.
Lobdell, C. H. 1972. MAST: A budget allocation system for wildlife management. Unpub. Ph.D. Dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Va. vi + 227 pp.
March, J. G. 1988. Decisions and organizations. Basil Blackwell, Ltd., Oxford, UK.
Rita
Wajda, R. K. 1993. A site-specific rainfall made for Western Virginia ecosystems. M.S. Thesis, Va. Poly. Inst. and State Univ., Blacksburg, Va. xi + 143 pp.
Waldon
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